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Introduction

he Deepwater Horizon tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico in
2010, which resulted in the largest ever accidental marine
oil spill,1 was a stark reminder of the environmental
risks posed by the oil and gas industry. Although disasters on
this scale are fortunately rare, the average oil and gas operation
has many other commonplace, yet significant, environmental
impacts throughout its lifespan. Environmental issues begin with
exploration activities—seismic tests, used to locate petroleum,
often disturb local wildlife—and carry on to the end of the production phase when facilities must be dismantled and disposed
of.2 The everyday operation of many offshore petroleum installations involves the discharge of oil-contaminated “produced
water,” drill cuttings and mud, and production chemicals.3
Onshore, land clearing for base camps, helipads, roads, pipelines, waste disposal sites, and other facilities has a considerable
ecological impact.4 Furthermore, the industry is a significant
contributor to air pollution and a major emitter of greenhouse
gases. In 2008, thirty-two companies in the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (“OGP”) reported emissions of
296 million tonnes (metric tons) of carbon dioxide, 2.1 million
tonnes of methane, 1.1 million tonnes of non-methane volatile
organic compounds, 366 thousand tonnes of sulfur dioxide, and
827 thousand tonnes of nitrous oxides.5
The industry faces increasingly strict environmental standards in developed countries such as the United States and the
United Kingdom.6 However, the majority of the world’s proven
oil reserves are in developing countries and economies in transition, which often lack sophisticated regimes for environmental
protection.7 Even when legislative frameworks are well developed, there are often deficiencies in capacity and an unwillingness to monitor and enforce environmental regulation.8 There is,
furthermore, no comprehensive global convention on the environmental impacts of petroleum exploration and production.9
Although a number of multilateral and regional agreements
cover certain aspects of the industry, they require adoption into
domestic legislation to have a direct effect on international oil
companies (“IOCs”).10
Apart from domestic and international law, one could also
look at conditions attached to loans and investment insurance,
as well as voluntary corporate social responsibility codes as
sources of environmental standards for the petroleum industry.11
However, the intent of this article is to shine a light on a much
less studied and poorly understood domain of environmental
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regulation: the foreign investment contracts signed between
IOCs (or consortiums of IOCs) and host states, which allocate
rights to explore for and exploit hydrocarbons within an area of
land (or an offshore block) over a fixed period of time.
In a 1994 monograph, Zhiguo Gao noted that environmental issues had “not received enough attention” in the oil and gas
contracts he had reviewed.12 His conclusion raises the question
of whether environmental issues have received greater attention in more recent oil and gas contracts (i.e. those negotiated
and signed in the last fifteen years). This question is difficult to
answer, not least because foreign investment contracts generally are not disclosed to the public.13 Many governments’ model
agreements are publicly available,14 but it should be noted that
these models may be substantially altered or ignored altogether
in the negotiation of actual contracts.15
In this article, sample clauses from forty-one upstream oil
and gas contracts (both onshore and offshore) covering thirtyfive countries and the period 1994-2008 were reviewed. Fourteen of the contracts were models.16 An effort was made to
find the most up-to-date model contracts, as governments periodically revise them. However, it should be noted that some of
the models were undated. The twenty-seven signed contracts
reviewed were from twenty-six different countries17 and had an
average signature date of 1999. Some of contracts in the sample
are available on the Internet, either because governments have
chosen to release them or because they have been leaked to nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) that have subsequently
published them. Others are available in company filings to the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
Given the small number of contracts that were reviewed, and
the great variety of clauses that were encountered, nothing can be
extrapolated from this preliminary survey about the frequency
with which any particular type of clause is likely to appear in oil
and gas contracts. Furthermore, in any given situation, a contract
should be considered within the broader context of a country’s
petroleum law, environmental law, and other domestic legislation. The purpose of the article is not to provide a full picture of
environmental regulation of petroleum operations in individual
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countries, but instead to draw attention to how contracts can
either bolster or undermine environmental protection efforts.

Types of Foreign Investment Contracts
There are three main types of foreign investment contracts
in the upstream oil and gas sector: (1) concessions or licenses;
(2) production sharing contracts (or agreements) (“PSCs” or
“PSAs”); and (3) risk-service contracts. In addition, all three
may be subject to association or joint-venture agreements.18
Under concession contracts and licenses, IOCs are often given
exclusive rights to explore for and produce hydrocarbons and in
return are required to pay royalties, taxes, and fees to the government.19 In a PSC, the IOC has similar rights, but obtains only
“cost oil” and a share of any “profit oil” produced, with the state
recouping the remainder in lieu of, or sometimes in addition to,
collecting royalties.20 The IOC also pays taxes and fees.21 Under
a risk-service contract the IOC explores for and produces petroleum on behalf the government and is paid a fee for its services,
with a possible right to buy a portion of the production.22 Association or joint venture agreements involve IOCs partnering with
host governments or state-owned enterprises and, as in a PSC,
sharing petroleum production.23
In practice, these forms and labels tend to be much less
important than the specific content of a contract. 24 However,
one relevant difference is that unlike a typical concession, an
IOC’s costs are generally recoverable under a PSC in the form
of “cost oil.” 25 If costs associated with remediating and compensating for environmental harm are “cost recoverable,” then
the host government, not the IOC, would assume the risk of such
costs.26 A similar issue may arise with risk-service contracts and
even with concessions that have royalty rates that are somehow
indexed to costs.

Environmental Standards Clauses
Most, though not all, of the oil and gas contracts reviewed
contained a section on the environmental standards to be applied
to the project. In this regard, there are five general forms that
contracts appear to follow:
(i) reference to domestic environmental law only;
(ii) reference to international industry standards only;
(iii) reference to both domestic law and international
industry standards;
(iv) reference to domestic law and/or industry
standards and international environmental
agreements; or
(v) development of project-specific environmental
standards.
Some reference to domestic environmental legislation is
clearly desirable from a public policy perspective. Domestic
standards have been developed (in most cases) under a democratic system of rule, have often been designed with local environmental conditions in mind, are familiar to the agencies that
are tasked with monitoring and enforcement, and are in the public domain. However, as noted previously, in many developing
countries environmental regulation of the oil and gas sector is
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still in its infancy and it may be inadequate in some situations.27
As such, reference in contracts to domestic legislation alone may
be undesirable. In any event, it would appear that parties rarely
adopt this form. A contract from Peru28 and one from Algeria29
were the only contracts in the sample that referred solely to
domestic environmental legislation.
In several of the contracts in the sample, the parties instead
included a reference to international industry standards and
failed to mention the application of domestic environmental law.30 The advantage from an environmental perspective
of referring to international industry standards is that in some
cases, they may be higher than, or cover specific issues not
addressed in, domestic legislation. Furthermore, reference to
international standards allows some scope for change and evolution of the environmental management regime of an investment
over time, thus providing a way around a contractual requirement for stability, as will be discussed below. However, there are
serious problems with referring only to industry standards, given
their inherent ambiguity. The terminology “good oilfield practices”31 or “good production practices”32 is frequently employed
in environmental standards clauses, as well as in other types of
provisions discussed further below, but these phrases are seldom
defined.33 A 2002 Cambodian contract provides a rare example
of a definition:
Good Petroleum Industry Practices means the standards
and practices, and exercise of that degree of skill, prudence and foresight that would reasonably be expected
of persons carrying out international petroleum operations, and adherence to generally accepted standards of
the international petroleum industry, including sound
environmental provisions.34
It is not at all clear where exactly one should look for “generally accepted standards” as there are a multitude of potential
sources. For example, members of the American Petroleum Institute (“API”) “pledge” to manage their businesses according to a
set of eleven environmental principles.35 However, the majority
of these principles are imprecise, such as the commitment “to
reduce overall emission and waste generation.”36 The API also
has guidelines for environmental protection in both onshore
and offshore oil and gas operations, although they are not freely
available to the public.37 Other potential sources include guidelines produced by the previously mentioned OGP,38 the Australian Petroleum Production & Exploration Association,39 as well
as bodies such as the International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”).40 As Wawryk notes, the existence of so many
guidelines in the petroleum industry makes it impossible to point
to one that can definitively be considered “good” practice and
furthermore the “actual practices of international oil companies .
. . vary from company to company and, for one company, across
jurisdictions . . . making it difficult to identify the best practices
actually in use.”41
The majority of contracts reviewed for this article contained
reference to both domestic environmental law and international
industry standards. In most cases, there was no mention of how
these two sources of standards would be reconciled in the event
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of a conflict. However, in some contracts a form of hierarchy was
established. For example, Article 21.1 of Brazil’s 2001 Model
Concession Contract indicates that industry standards are only
intended to act as a supplement to domestic legislation:
The Concessionaire shall adopt, at its own cost and
risk, all the necessary measures for the conservation of
reservoirs and other natural resources and for the protection of the air, soil and water in the surface or in the
subsurface, subject to Brazilian legislation and rules
about environment and, in their absence or lack, adopting Oil Industry Best Practice in this regard.42
In contrast, the clause below, from a 1994 Azerbaijani contract, has evidently been adopted to ensure that domestic environmental regulation is not more stringent than international
industry standards:
Contractor shall comply with present and future Azerbaijani laws or regulations of general applicability with
respect to public health, safety and protection and restoration of the environment, to the extent that such laws
and regulations are no more stringent than the then
current international Petroleum industry standards and
practices being at the date of execution of this Contract
those shown in Appendix IX, with which Contractor
shall comply.43
In addition to domestic law and industry standards, some
oil and gas contracts refer to international environmental agreements, although this does not seem to be a common practice. One
example is Article 6.5 of Liberia’s Model PSC, which states that:
“The Contractor further undertakes to carry out all petroleum
operations in accordance with the Environmental Protection
and Management Laws of Liberia and all international environmental practice.”44 It is questionable whether such a sweeping
reference to international environmental law will have anything
more than symbolic value. Provisions in multilateral environmental agreements are not only typically “soft” in nature; they
also generally require adoption in domestic legislation before
they can have any impact on private actors.45 Furthermore, few
environmental agreements tackle specific issues concerning the
management of petroleum exploration and production. However,
there are some treaties covering marine pollution that are relevant to offshore operations.46 In this respect, Mauritania’s 1994
Model PSC is less ambiguous in its reference to international
environmental law, noting in Article 6.6 that:
The Contractor shall take ail [sic] necessary precautions
to prevent pollution of the marine area of the Exploration Perimeter and observe, inter alias, the provisions
of the International Convention on the prevention of
petroleum pollution of sea waters signed in London on
May 12, 1954 and the amendments and texts enacted
for the implementation thereof.47
The final form of standards clause observed in the sample,
although only in one contract, is the development of a project-specific environmental regime. A 1996 contract between
Azerbaijan and a consortium of investors stipulates that the contractor, the state-owned oil company, and the State Committee
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on Ecology and Control over the Use of Natural Resources will
jointly agree on a set of safety and environmental standards
based on “(i) international petroleum industry standards and
experience with their implementation in exploration and production operations in other parts of the world and (ii) existing
Azerbaijan safety and environmental legislation.”48 Once developed, this set of standards can only be altered through a written
agreement and if any standards that have not been agreed upon
are applied to the project, the investor can invoke the contract’s
stabilization clause.

Stabilization Clauses
According to a 2008 study, the use of “stabilization clauses”
in host-government contracts “is widespread across industries
and regions of the world.”49 Stabilization clauses come in various forms.50 In their most basic form, they “freeze” the law that
applies to the investment at the time the contract is signed.51 A
more nuanced version is often referred to as an “economic equilibrium” clause, which requires the government to restore the
balance of risks and rewards established in a contract when it is
upset by a new regulation or tax.52 A stabilization clause can be
strictly circumscribed to only cover very specific issues, or the
parties to the contract can explicitly “carve out” areas such as
environmental protection from its application. For example, in a
1997 contract from Kazakhstan, the stabilization clause contains
the caveat:
provided, however, that no amendment to this Agreement shall be required hereunder as the result of (i)
changes to Laws concerning health, safety or environmental protection that cause such Laws to be consistent
with international standards for health, safety or environmental legislation and are applied on a non-discriminatory basis . . . .53
As Lorenzo Cotula notes, this provision is weakened by its
ambiguous reference to “international standards,”54 but it is still
far preferable to the stabilization clauses found in many contracts and even in model agreements that are worded in such a
broad manner that they can stifle any future regulation that might
be perceived to undermine the profitability of an investment,
including efforts to address corruption, to safeguard human
rights (including labor rights), and to protect the environment.55

Environmental Impact Assessment Clauses
Environmental Impact Assessments (“EIAs”) and corresponding management plans have become a staple requirement
for investment projects in many sectors.56 Unfortunately, a recent
survey of environmental governance in petroleum producing
countries commissioned by the World Bank found that “much
of the emphasis of the EIA process appears directed towards
the approval of oil and gas projects, rather than to a life cycle
approach for minimizing environmental and social impact.”57
An EIA is typically mandated to be completed after a contract with the state has been signed58 and most of the contracts
reviewed for this article contained some reference to the need
for an EIA. However, the form of the EIA clauses varied widely
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

across the sample from a simple note of the existence of a
requirement,59 to detailed specifications of what the EIA should
cover, who should prepare it, when it should be submitted, and
so forth.60

Clauses On Access To Protected Areas
Petroleum operations are particularly contentious when
they are located, even partially, within wildlife reserves, parks,
or areas of cultural or biological significance.61 NGOs have
long argued that such areas should be off limits to the extractive industries,62 but most governments are not ready to forgo
the potential economic opportunities that the exploitation of
these areas offer. This is evident in several of the contracts in the
sample. For example, Article 37.6 of Madagascar’s 2006 Model
Offshore PSC states:
In the event that a portion of the Contract Area is
located within a natural reserve area, the Operator shall
deploy the necessary efforts in order to minimize the
negative impacts on these natural reserves, in accordance with generally accepted environmental practices
in the international petroleum industry.63
This is an incredibly weak provision. A 2004 PSC from
Uganda is similarly permissive, but it also contains a bizarre
caveat:
In the event of protest from responsible concerned third
parties within or outside Uganda regarding the conduct
of Petroleum Operations in any National Park or Game
Reserve and the consequent effects upon the environment or wildlife, the Government and Licensee shall
meet to determine what if any action should be taken.64
Given that this clause provides nothing more than an obligation for the investor and the government to meet, it is questionable why the parties bothered to include it at all.

Clauses on Access to Water &
Other Natural Resources
Petroleum operations require natural materials in their construction phase, and significant amounts of water and electricity
throughout their operation. While many operations are self-sufficient in terms of energy supply, other natural resources may need
to be obtained from within or outside the contract area.
From an environmental and community rights perspective,
as well as from an economic-development perspective, it is disturbing that many governments appear to focus solely on the
potential revenue that they can obtain from petroleum production and are willing to simply give away other valuable natural
resources under the terms of oil and gas contracts. For example,
Article 27.8 of Mozambique’s 2007 Model concession contract
provides for the right of the investor “to drill for and have the free
use of water and impound surface waters.”65 A contract from the
Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq is even broader, giving
the contractor the right to “freely use sand, water, electricity, and
any other natural resources located inside or outside the Contract
Area for the Petroleum Operations.”66
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Some of the contracts in the sample were completely silent
on the issue of access to natural resources, and a small number had more nuanced provisions than those quoted above. For
example, a 1994 contract from Ethiopia states that the contractor shall “have the right, subject to the approval of the Minister,
to use water in the Contract Area for operational purposes, but
the Contractor shall not deprive any land, domestic settlement
or livestock watering place of the water supply to which they
are accustomed.”67 A 2008 Model PSC from Bangladesh goes a
step further by requiring that the contractor pay for the natural
resources, such as water, that it utilizes.68

Clauses on Gas Flaring
The World Bank estimated in 2004 that the volume of associated gas being flared and vented globally every year was about
110 billion cubic meters—enough fuel to provide the combined
annual natural gas consumption of Germany and France.69
Although some short-term flaring during testing or in cases of
emergencies is accepted as standard practice in the industry, the
flaring of more substantial amounts of gas is only practiced in
poor countries with limited infrastructure and weak regulatory
institutions.70 Aside from being incredibly wasteful, flaring has a
significant impact on local air quality and also makes an appreciable contribution to climate change.71 At the World Summit on
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, the World
Bank launched a Global Gas Flaring Reduction initiative to
tackle the problem.72 Despite this development, and widespread
condemnation of the practice, flaring continues in many states.
In 2008, thirty-two companies in the OGP admitted to flaring
18.6 tonnes of gas for every thousand tonnes of hydrocarbon that
they produced.73
Many oil and gas contracts, even recent models, appear to
be lenient on the issue of flaring. For example, the Bangladesh
2008 Model PSC notes in Article 15.3 that:
Any Associated Natural Gas as is not used under Article
15.1 or Article 15.2 and which Contractor does not consider possible to recover economically shall be offered
to Petrobangla without any payment to Contractor but
at Petrobangla’s cost at the well-head or field facilities
in the Production Area. To the extent that Petrobangla
does not so take any of such Associated Natural Gas,
Contractor may flare such Associated Natural Gas provided that such flaring is included in the Development
Plan submitted under Article 8.10.74
Although this clause gives priority to utilization of the
resource, there is no requirement for the gas to be reinjected
into the ground if it is not taken by the state-owned enterprise,
and economic concerns clearly trump environmental ones.75 A
1997 contract from Indonesia also reflects this position in the
statement that gas “may be flared if processing and utilization
thereof is not economical.”76 Other contracts, such as a 2000
contract from Belize77 and a 1998 contract from Angola,78 allow
for flaring only if it is authorized by the government. A Ugandan contract from 2004 also follows this model, but includes the
caveat that the government’s consent “shall not be unreasonably
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withheld or delayed.”79 The most stringent clauses, found in only
a few contracts in the sample, restricted flaring to cases of an
emergency or for safety reasons.80

Clauses on Responding to Emergencies
and Accidents
In 2008, thirty-two companies in the OGP reported 2,978
spills greater than one barrel in size, resulting in the release of
18,266 tonnes of oil into terrestrial and marine environments.81
In many of the oil and gas contracts in the sample, the parties
have recognized that spills and other accidents and emergencies
have the potential to occur and should be planned for. As such,
as a part or separate from an EIA, an emergency response plan is
often required from the contractor.82
Some oil and gas contracts also cover three additional elements in respect of emergencies: notification, response, and
consequences for failure to respond. In the oil and gas contracts
reviewed, notification was limited to the contractor apprising the
government of the situation, but not the local community or the
broader public.83 In terms of response, the requirements were
often vague (e.g., “take prudent steps”) or simply provided reference to good oilfield practices.84 However, some of the contracts
in the sample did additionally stipulate that in the event that the
contractor did not act promptly to respond to an emergency or
accident, the government had the right to mount its own response
and charge the contractor for expenses that it incurred in doing
so. An example is found in a PSC from Ghana:
If Contractor does not act promptly so as to control,
clean up or repair any pollution or damage, GNPC
[Ghana National Petroleum Corporation] may, after
giving Contractor reasonable notice in the circumstances, take any actions which are necessary, in accordance with accepted Petroleum industry practice and
the reasonable costs and expenses of such actions shall
be borne by Contractor and shall, subject to Article
17.5 be included as Petroleum Costs.85

Clauses on Liability, Indemnity, & Insurance
Liability for environmental damage is an increasingly
important issue for the oil industry. The dispute between Chevron and the residents of the Ecuadorian Amazon concerning the
company’s liability for oil pollution is a prime example of why
most modern contracts have express provisions on liability that
cover environmental damage.86
Issues of liability for environmental damage can be complex, especially when multiple parties, including state-owned
enterprises, are involved in petroleum production. Contracts,
therefore, should have provisions that are explicit about who is
to be liable for what and to whom. The issue of “who” depends
somewhat on the form of contract, but generally it is the contractor or concessionaire (the IOC) who will be liable, except in
cases where fault can be directly attributed to the state or stateowned enterprise.87 If there is more than one contractor involved
in the project, then there will likely be a clause that stipulates
that they are jointly and severally liable.88
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The issue of “what” concerns the types of harms (e.g., only
death or injury or also “damage to the environment”), the period
in which the harms were caused (i.e. no liability for prior environmental damage established in a baseline assessment), and the
legal form of the liability (fault, strict, or absolute).89 Finally, on
the issue of to “whom” the contractor is liable, there are typically two separate issues covered in contracts: liability to the
state and liability to third parties. 90 In the latter case, the issue is
not directly one of liability—contracts cannot affect the rights of
third parties under national law—but rather one of indemnity.91
Through indemnity clauses, IOCs commit to compensate states
for any costs incurred resulting from a third-party liability suit.92
Most contracts in the sample made specific mention of
“pollution” or “environmental damage” in liability/indemnity
clauses and adopted a strict liability approach.93 However, a
2002 Cambodian94 contract provided only for fault liability. The
most developed liability/indemnity clause in the sample was
from a contract signed by Belize in 2000, which required that the
contractor contribute one tenth of one percent of the value of the
gross annual production to a fund managed by the government
“for the sole purpose of indemnification against any or all environmental damages cause during the petroleum operations.”95
An additional issue closely related to liability and indemnity
is the requirement for contractors to have insurance coverage.
These clauses often specify that insurance should cover “pollution” or “environmental damage.”96 One potential problem with
both liability/indemnity and insurance clauses is that the term
“pollution” is quite narrow and does not cover all of the various environmental impacts from oil and gas operations.97 Even
references to “environmental damage” could be subject to interpretation if not defined in the contract.

Clauses on Decommissioning & Remediation
When an oil operation reaches the end of production, a
number of costly activities must be undertaken. Onshore wells
need to be plugged and structures dismantled, with materials
removed and ultimately recycled or disposed of. Remediation of
the local environment (e.g., decontamination and revegetation)
may also be required. Offshore installations present particularly
complex issues in terms of decommissioning, although it is also
in this area that international law has its most direct and significant impact on the oil and gas industry.98
The extent to which decommissioning is dealt with in contracts depends somewhat on the contractual relationship between
the parties and the expected life of the project. Under some
arrangements, states retain ownership over production facilities
and may continue operations after the termination of the contract. However, even in such instances, there may be contractual
provisions covering decommissioning of installations that are
not destined to be taken over by the state.
Clauses on decommissioning and remediation found in contracts in the sample were generally lacking in detail. For example, a 1997 PSC from Benin states:
At the end of the Contract, in any other situation than
the abandonment case, the Contractor must take the
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

measures according to the Good Practices of the Oil
Industry to restore the environment and the sites where
the Petroleum Operations have been performed to
their original state on the Effective Date of the Contract, taking into account the rules of the abandonment
procedure.99
Although this provision appears quite strict, as it suggests that sites should be restored to their “original state,” it is
weakened by the generic reference to good oilfield practices.100
According to a recent World Bank report, the absence of guidelines for what should be included in a decommissioning plan is a
pervasive problem in petroleum producing countries.101
In addition to an absence of guidelines, there are obviously
strong incentives for some companies to “cut and run” or to conduct only superficial remediation to minimize costs. One method
for ensuring that decommissioning and remediation are carried
out to plan is to use a financial mechanism such as a performance bond or reserve fund. Tanzania is an example of a country
that has set up such a regime in its 2008 Model PSC.102

Conclusion
Since Gao’s study was published in 1994,103 there have
been significant changes in the content of upstream oil and gas

contracts vis-à-vis environmental protection. The small sample
of contracts reviewed in this article indicates that a significant
number of clauses covering a variety of issues—from baseline
environmental assessments all the way through to environmental
remediation—can be found in modern contracts. Given the monumental increase in environmental awareness and the intense
scrutiny that the industry has come under in the two decades,
this is unsurprising. What is remarkable is that a handful of contracts still resemble those that Gao criticized for having only a
token mention of environmental protection, and that references
to ambiguous terms such as “good oilfield practices” remain so
pervasive.
Further research will be required to build an understanding of why there are such wide disparities in contracting practice between countries. For example, it would be interesting to
explore whether the environmental provisions in oil and gas contracts reflect domestic attention to these issues or if the capacity of the government to negotiate with IOCs is a more relevant
factor. Additionally, empirical work is required to determine the
extent to which contract clauses on environmental issues are
actually implemented by IOCs and monitored and enforced by
governments.
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